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Abstract
Recent years have seen a protracted debate on the "fiscal theory of the price level". This
doctrine is based on the intertemporal government budget constraint, which says that the real
value of the government debt equals the discounted value of future government surpluses. It
is observed that the intertemporal government budget constraint consists of the proposition
that government debt management defines a portfolio strategy that has no bubble. Therefore
the intertemporal government budget constraint is satisfied in models in which bubbles can
be ruled out, and it fails in settings in which bubbles can occur in equilibrium.
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cal theory of the price level￿ (Eric Leeper (1991), Michael Woodford (1995), John H.
Cochrane (1998), Narayana Kocherlakota and Christopher Phelan (1999), for exam-
ple). The analysis is based on the ￿intertemporal government budget constraint￿
(hereafter IGBC), which says that the real value of government liabilities equals
the discounted value of future government surpluses. Cochrane, in contrast to such
writers as Thomas Sargent and Neil Wallace (1981), expressed the opinion that the
IGBC is correctly interpreted as an equilibrium condition rather than as a budget
constraint: instead of restricting government ￿scal and monetary policy, it should
be seen as determining the price level.1 Since the IGBC is derived by substituting
the single-period government budget constraint￿which, in the simplest version, says
that the government￿s budget de￿cit equals the value of newly-issued government
debt￿into itself recursively and taking a limit, it is not clear why Cochrane resisted
characterizing the IGBC as a budget constraint.
We provide a reason here, although it may not be what Cochrane had in mind.
1 The Intertemporal Budget Constraint
Begin with the single-period government budget constraint, given by
st = bt−1(1 + rt) − bt, (1)
t =1 ,2,..., where bt denotes the value of outstanding government bonds at date t,
st is the government primary surplus (the primary surplus equals the budget surplus
as conventionally measured plus interest on the outstanding debt), and rt is the real
return on bonds from t − 1 to t. This version of the budget constraint suppresses
nominal prices, money and the seigniorage revenue associated with money creation.


















−1bn =0 , (3)
1This observation re￿ects a tendency on the part of many analysts to view particular equations
as determining particular variables, so that discussion centered on whether one should think of the
price level as determined by a quantity equation or, instead, by the IGBC. Such loose treatment
rarely extends to formal modeling, where analysts generally recognize that the question is whether
some endogenous variables are determined in upper recursive blocks, so that they can be taken as
given in some equations. This consideration motivated Woodford￿s distinction between ￿Ricardian￿
and ￿non-Ricardian￿ ￿scal policies.








Justi￿cation for (3) is never provided in the macroeconomics literature, yet it is
the imposition of this condition that justi￿es characterizing (4) as an equilibrium
condition rather than a budget constraint.
From the point of view of the private sector, the transversality condition (3) says
that the portfolio strategy of private-sector investors collectively in lending to the
government has no bubble, so the value of the debt equals the discounted value of
future primary surpluses. A large literature has analyzed theoretical conditions
under which portfolio strategies can or must have bubbles in equilibrium; to date
this literature has not been connected with the discussion of the IGBC and the ￿scal
theory of the price level. This note brings these two literatures together.
Since we are interested in the IGBC itself, rather than in its application in the ￿scal
theory of the nominal price level, we can work with nonmonetary general equilibrium
models throughout. Further, the issues of interest do not involve uncertainty, so it
is appropriate to restrict attention to deterministic models.
2 Overlapping Generations Models
Following the papers of Neil Wallace (1980) and Jean Tirole (1985), overlapping
generations models have become the standard vehicles for analyzing bubbles. The
reason is that, because the number of both goods and agents is in￿nite, equilibrium
allocations in overlapping generations models can be Pareto-suboptimal even in the
absence of externalities and the like. Therefore the positive wealth increment to
owners of securities (in positive net supply) implied by existence of bubbles does
not necessarily contradict the feasibility of the equilibrium allocation. In contrast,
when the equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal the wealth increment that would
be implied by a bubble on a security in positive net supply would contradict Walras￿
Law, so the bubble cannot exist (see Manuel Santos and Michael Woodford (1997),
Kevin X. D. Huang and Jan Werner (2000) and LeRoy (2004) for further discussion).
These ideas are readily applied to the IGBC. Beginning with a standard determin-
istic overlapping generations model without production, one can add a government
which runs surpluses and de￿cits. In the simplest case, which is suﬃcient for the
present purpose, surpluses are generated by lump-sum taxation accompanied by debt
repayment or loans to the private sector, while de￿cits are associated with lump-sum
transfers to private agents accompanied by borrowing from the private sector. If the
government ran de￿cits in the past it has positive indebtedness to the private sector,
while if it ran surpluses in the past it is a net holder of the liabilities of the private
sector.
2If equilibrium interest rates are positive, the aggregate endowment has ￿nite value.
It follows both that the equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal and that bubbles can-
not exist on the government￿s portfolio strategy. If they did exist, private agents￿
wealth (equal to the value of the debt plus the present value of future endowments)
would not equal the present value of consumption, a violation of Walras￿ Law. Ex-
istence of a bubble on the government debt would imply that the government debt
would increase to the point where agents could no longer transfer it from generation
to generation. Absence of a bubble on the government debt implies that the IGBC
is necessarily satis￿ed. Therefore the positive interest rate condition implies the
validity of the IGBC.
In contrast, if the endowment pattern is such that equilibrium interest rates in
the bubble-free equilibrium are negative, then the aggregate endowment has in￿nite
value. Therefore Walras￿ Law fails and the endowment allocation is not Pareto
optimal.2 In that case there exists a continuum of equilibrium paths. On all but
one of these paths the IGBC is not satis￿ed due to the existence of a bubble on the
equilibrium portfolio strategy.
Most simply, one can imagine a situation in which the private sector holds a strictly
positive amount of government debt, and the government implements a balanced
budget forever in the future. This setting, of course, is exactly that used in monetary
economics to demonstrate how money can be valued despite being intrinsically useless
(Wallace (1980)).
3C o n c l u s i o n
It follows from this analysis that the virtually universal practice of assuming the auto-
matic validity of the IGBC in the analysis of ￿scal policy is, at best, very loose. If one
wants the IGBC, a better procedure would involve explicitly adopting assumptions
that rule out bubbles. One way to do this is to state explicitly the trading restrictions
that are necessary in any model involving an in￿nite future if Ponzi schemes are to
be avoided. Depending on what trading restrictions are invoked to eliminate Ponzi
schemes, bubbles may or may not also be ruled out. For example, in overlapping
generations models it is natural to restrict agents￿ trades to their lifetimes; doing so
eliminates Ponzi schemes, but does not prevent bubbles. In contrast, a prohibition on
unbounded short selling precludes Ponzi schemes when there is no bubble, because in
that case any Ponzi scheme leads to unbounded portfolio strategies. However, in the
presence of a bubble, Ponzi schemes are associated with bounded portfolio strategies,
implying that in the presence of a bubble Ponzi schemes can be operated without
violating the trading restriction. Because these Ponzi schemes can be operated on
any scale, their presence is inconsistent with existence of equilibrium. Therefore a
2For simplicity we are ignoring the boundary case, in which the endowment has in￿nite value,
but the equilibrium is Pareto optimal (by the Cass (1972) criterion).
3prohibition on unbounded short selling rules out equilibria with bubbles. See Huang
and Werner (2000) for further discussion.
Alternatively, the endowment pattern and technology can be restricted so that
equilibrium interest rates turn out to be positive. This course has the advantage of
agreeing with the empirical evidence, at least if the analysis of Abel et al. (1989) is
accepted. I have observed elsewhere (LeRoy (2004)), however, that ruling out bubbles
by invoking the Pareto optimality of equilibrium is putting the neoclassical/rational
expectations paradigm to very hard use.
If one is unwilling to make any of assumptions that rule out bubbles, one must
allow for the possibility of bubbles on the equilibrium portfolio strategy of private
agents. The indeterminacy of equilibrium that results when bubbles are admitted
renders it diﬃcult to reach de￿nite conclusions. In particular, the justi￿cation for the
￿scal theory of the price level would be very much in question, given its dependence
on the IGBC. However, it seems better to face these problems explicitly than to
avoid them by directly invoking the IGBC.
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